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Abstract—In the problem of location anonymity of the events
exposed to a global eavesdropper, we highlight and analyze some
aspects that are missing in the prior work, which is especially
relevant for the quality of secure sensing in delay-intolerant appli-
cations monitoring rare and spatially sparse events, and deployed
as large wireless sensor networks with single data collector. We
propose an efficient scheme for generating fake network traffic to
disguise the real event notification. The efficiency of the scheme
that provides statistical source location anonymity is achieved
by partitioning network nodes randomly into several dummy
source groups. Members of the same group collectively emulate
both temporal and spatial distribution of the event. Under such
dummy-traffic framework of the source anonymity protection,
we aim to better model the global eavesdropper, especially her
way of using statistical tests to detect the real event, and to
present the quality of the location protection as relative to the
adversary’s strength. In addition, our approach aims to reduce
the per-event work spent to generate the fake traffic while, most
importantly, providing a guaranteed latency in reporting the
event. The latency is controlled by decoupling the routing from
the fake-traffic schedule. A good dummy source group design also
provides a robust protection of event bursts. This is achieved at
the expense of the significant overhead as the number of dummy
source groups must be increased to the reciprocal value of the
false alarm parameter used in the statistical test. We believe
that the proposed source anonymity protection strategy, and the
evaluation framework, are well justified by the abundance of
the applications that monitor a rare event with known temporal
statistics, and uniform spatial distribution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy issues are an important aspect of monitoring appli-
cations in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). A recent survey
of state-of-the-art research on privacy protection in WSNs [6],
among other problems, reviews strategies to protect the object
observed by a WSN node, referred to as source, from the
global eavesdropper (Eve) [5], which can infer the location of
the object based on the established location of the source.
A. Problem Description
The observed object may be a smuggler crossing the border,
an important person entering a classified area, or endangered
animals monitored in their habitats. Messages from the source
are propagated in a traditional hop-by-hop manner, and di-
rected to a fixed data collector, referred to as a base station,
or a sink. Sink protection is not an issue as the adversary
usually knows the sink, in fact she may even know the whole
topology of the sensor network. In addition, Eve detects the
timing and location of all transmissions in the network (hence
global); she can hear and capture any packet sent in the
network (either with a very powerful antenna or she has her
own sensor network deployed in the area). Eve is powerful: she
can employ complex statistical algorithms for detection, and
arbitrary localization techniques. However, the message itself
is encrypted and Eve does not know the encryption, hence
she cannot capture the message and infer the object’s position
from the content. In addition, Eve, despite being so powerful
and omnipresent, needs to stay invisible. We define outage as
the event when, following an eavesdropped transmission, Eve
reveals itself by taking actions based on the false suspicion that
an event occurred. The actions may involve physical presence
of the attacker or her faculties, in order to capture or destroy
the object. Hence, a false-alarm presents a risk of personal
exposure and liability.
The adversary gathers the source of the transmission based
on the change in the traffic pattern; a conspicuous case would
be when a node starts transmitting after a prolonged period of
inactivity in the WSN. For many event-reporting applications,
despite the fact that the attacker cannot learn the details from
the message content, inferring the contextual information, i.e.
whether, when and where a concerned event has happened,
may be enough to jeopardize monitored resources. Intuitively,
the persistent dummy (fake) traffic is the only way to obfuscate
the events, and the formal proof for it is available in [5].
Dummy packets follow a predefined schedule, aligned with the
expected timeline of real packets, so that Eve cannot observe
the change. To better explain the intricacies of this approach,
especially in light of the existing research, we next introduce
two models of monitored phenomena. Let us first define the
application delay as the delay in event reporting. In both
scenarios, the duration of time is relative to the application
delay constraint, which is a known value. We assume that the
WSN is divided into cells, such that each sensor node monitors
a unique cell and that the events are occurring in a uniform
manner over time and space. An active event is any event that
is not reported to the sink yet.
1) Scenario A: Frequent and Dense Events: This model
describes monitoring of a physical phenomena that creates
on average one event per cell over one cycle, a relatively
short period of time, whose duration is larger but of the same
order of magnitude as the application latency constraint. In
other words, in any cycle, there are many active events in the
network.
2) Scenario B: Rare and Spatially Sparse Events: In this
model, the events are rare and isolated. For example, if the
allowed application delay is in minutes, the expected interval
between events is measured in hours or days. They are spa-
tially sparse: we assume that there is at most one active event
at a time. In fact, the examples of monitoring applications
at the beginning of I-A all represent the scenario B. No
single node can statistically emulate the spatial and temporal
characteristics of the events in this model. In addition, by
observing a single node for the duration on the order of
the application delay Eve can not reliably deduce deviation
from the expected behavior. Consequently, Eve attempts to
observe abnormalities in the network-wide traffic pattern. The
anonymity protection scheme described here implements the
traffic pattern in a decentralized manner, so that the occurrence
of real events does not cause observable abnormalities.
B. Solution Outline
The uniform spatial/time distribution of events guides nat-
urally the baseline scenario for the dummy traffic: all cells
in the network send dummy messages at a constant rate
regardless of whether a real event has occurred or not. That
means that an event would have to wait to be reported on
average for half of the inter-transmission interval. However,
since the traffic in the network always keeps the same pattern,
it effectively defeats any traffic analysis techniques. The main
problem with dummy traffic is immediately obvious from the
basic scenario: limiting the reporting delay calls for a high-
rate fake traffic, which is not only expensive but may quickly
burn out the network.
Our approach stipulates the importance of knowing the
event’s temporal dynamics, in terms of the described scenarios;
it allows us to design energy-efficient protection strategies. It
is natural to assume that the expected frequency of events
will be known to everyone (both the attacker and the network
architect), given that we design the monitoring application
for a particular physical phenomena, and that the easiest
characterization of a random process is through its first mo-
ment, or the moment’s estimate. Next, among the all-positive
probability distributions with a given expected value, expo-
nential distribution has the highest entropy. Hence, assuming
that inter-event times follow an exponential distribution of
the estimated mean leads to a good and justifiable model of
the event’s randomness. In terms of traffic overhead/ energy-
consumption and interference, the optimal design would force
each node to transmit as rarely as possible, and that would be
in exponentially distributed intervals of the expected duration
exactly equal to the expected time between real events; smaller
intervals generate more traffic and therefore cost more, while
larger ones create too few opportunities for embedding the
real-traffic, especially under delay constraints.
The second major underpinning of our approach is the
network-centric view of the problem. The following aspects
of the problem are looked at from both the event’s and the
network’s perspective:
• Event is characterized as a spatio-temporal process over
the whole network area,
• Event-reporting delay includes routing latency,
• Fake-traffic shaping is a decentralized process, collabo-
ratively maintained by all nodes
• Energy consumption per-event of the protection strategy
is equally split among network nodes, and substantially
decreased with respect to the baseline strategy due to
nodes’ collaboration.
Finally, our source-anonymity protection scheme aims to
achieve statistical event unobservability. The absolute pro-
tection under baseline strategy is not applicable to delay-
sensitive applications, such is the majority of event monitoring
in WSNs. Secondly, we do not adjust the timing of real events
as in [7], to make the event pass the statistical test under the
test parameters assumed to be used by Eve. Instead, we make
the event pass the test with the same probability as the dummy
transmissions, making it statistically indistinguishable.
C. Existing Research
There are a couple of papers that study the WSN source
anonymity and, in our opinion, provide relatively efficient
solutions only under scenario A [5], [7], [8]. At the ex-
pense of huge traffic overhead, a practical tradeoff between
security and latency is proposed in [7]. The paper proposes
to decrease the delay in event notification by having every
WSN node maintain a random schedule sampled from the
same (exponential) distribution of inter-transmission intervals.
The improved latency in event notifications with respect to
the baseline approach is achieved without making the real
traffic observable by Eve. This approach assumes that the
attacker knows the defense strategy of the WSN, and that
he will use a state-of-the-art statistical test to distinguish the
real event from the fake once. The rationale is that fake
traffic, even if random, is designed to follow a distribution,
while the real events may not. According to [7], the event
sources should run the same test, and adjust the time of the
real event to pass the test. Here, the event sources test only
the intervals between own transmissions, as each node strives
to maintain exponentiality of its own intervals. The test is
assumed to be corrected for the finite sizes [2] by both Eve
and the sources. The paper compares two varieties of this
approach: one in which the real event embeds itself by waiting
until next scheduled transmission (ProbRate), and another one
(FitProbRate), when it waits as little as needed to pass the
goodness-of-fit test for the exponential distribution, inferred
from the previous transmissions. The latter approach results
in smaller delay, but requires the correction of the schedule:
the next scheduled fake event should be canceled, and the rest
of the schedule is also verified so that the test failure at the
next (dummy) transmission does not point out to the preceding
disturbance. For monitoring WSN applications described in
scenario A, where the spatio-temporal frequency of the events
justifies frequent transmissions from every node, and hence,
nodes create their own fake traffic, correcting the schedule
can be implemented as an extension of the dummy schedule
protocol. Let us note here that [7] does not explicitly state
that the exponential distribution of fake events is designed to
emulate the expected frequency of actual events, although it
can be inferred from the values used in the simulation. The
paper does not assume any particular event distribution, and,
consequently, does not evaluate the performance with respect
to overhead per event.
We further observe that the scheme proposed in [7] defines
delay as the time between the event occurrence and the
source’s transmission, which holds only for WSN applications
in which the sink is one hop away from any source. If
the packet is delivered to the sink in a hop-by-hop manner,
the latency includes another random part due to summation
of the exponentially distributed delays associated with such
transmission schedule of each relay. We refer to this additional
delay as the publishing route (PR) latency. When the expected
value λ of the inter-transmission times is the same at each
node, as in [7], and designed to imitate a relatively rare event
pattern, for the source-sink route of h hops, the PR latency
becomes an Erlang-distributed random variable with mean hλ.
From this point of view too, Scenario B requires a modified
approach to source anonymity.
To decrease the overhead of the dummy protection scheme
in [7], in [8] the same authors propose a WSN with several
proxy nodes, which pick up transmissions from surrounding
nodes, and filter out the dummy packets. Apart from requiring
mitigating solutions, frequent dummy traffic inevitably leads
to interference, which additionally increases the PR latency.
In summary, an important missing point in the existing
research is the analysis of the overhead per event, especially
in WSNs with rare and spatially sparse events. Under such a
scenario (B), let us scrutinize the approach in [7], where each
node generates its own fake traffic. As explained, the overhead-
optimal design would require each node to transmit with an
average rate equal to the expected frequency of real events.
For the cases simulated in [7] , the mean of dummy message
intervals is 20s, and real events arrive according to a Poisson
process with the rate changing from 1/20 to 1/100. Their
protection scheme achieves the average latency of less than
1s. If we replace seconds with hours, having in mind events
that happen once a day, or once a couple of days, the delay of
one hour does not seem to be acceptable. Additionally, under
the overhead-optimal design, the PR latency for rare events is
prohibitive, even for applications that are not delay-sensitive.
The next section briefly introduces our solution to this
problem. Section III describes and analyzes the decentralized
algorithm that implements the proposed solution. Section IV
presents the simulations for some of the most realistic and
important event dynamics, and demonstrates the superiority
of our approach in protecting the anonymity of such a source.
In section V we discuss statistical tests considered in our
approach. Finally, in VI, we conclude.
II. OUR APPROACH
A. System Model
We have a static WSN of n nodes. There is one static sink
collecting event notifications from all nodes. The monitoring
application is delay sensitive: the time between the event
occurrence and the sink’s notification must be smaller than
∆. We assume that monitored events have Poisson temporal
distribution of a known rate λ = 1/µ, and uniform spatial
distribution over the area of network deployment. Hence,
the time between the events is distributed according to a
exponential distribution ζµ (of expected value µ >> ∆). The
source is assumed to transmit a burst of packets, all describing
the event. For simplicity, we first analyze the burst of unit
length (one packet). In addition, we separately analyze the
existence of outliers in the event’s distribution.
B. Problem Formulation
We already established that the only way to confuse Eve
is through persistent network-wide transmissions. Simultane-
ously, as hop-by-hop is prevalent data transfer model in WSNs,
and distance to a sink may be considerable, to satisfy the
application latency constraints, we need to decouple routing
from the fake traffic schedule by allowing immediate relaying
of event notifications as opposed to piggybacking them on the
existing fake transmissions. However, as such a route may
be backtraced to the source, a similar routing path should
be emulated from each fake source (see Figure 1). Given the
mentioned constraints, we set the goal to achieve statistically
strong source anonymity through methods that optimize energy
and delay [5]. We hereby propose a pattern of fake traffic
that scales well with network size, and satisfies application-
latency constraints, while protecting the source location up to
a given significance level, defined under the strong statistical
tests available to Eve [4], [12]. To confuse the attacker, we
propose to replicate the spatio-temporal process through the
following mechanisms:
• Source Emulation: a subset of d nodes regularly wakes
up to act as dummy sources. As a result, any real
event is covered by d dummy sources, which we refer
to as dummy population. To explain what it means for
an event to be covered, we introduce a time interval,
dubbed round, whose duration is equal to the expected
inter-event time. Hence, the length of a round is µ.
Covering a source implies the expected existence of
fake transmissions in the same round in which the event
occurs. To engage all nodes equally, we may divide the
network in d groups and assign one representative of the
group to a distinct round. Each group will maintain a
schedule that emulates the event distribution ζµ. Due
to the size of the dummy population, the probability
distribution of the intervals between any two consecutive
dummy events is ζµ/d (exponential of expected value
µ/d). Such cooperative shaping of the fake traffic in
order to emulate a sufficiently dense Poisson distribu-
tion is amenable to distributed implementation, which is
thoroughly explained in Section III. It also allows us to
uniformly distribute fake activity across the network area.
However, as the attacker overhears every transmission
that occurs in the network, and may integrate all recorded
temporal data into one global network activity timeline,
it is judicious to ignore for a moment the decentralized
implementation. Instead, we look at the global timeline as
if it was produced by a single source sampling the values
of event inter-arrivals from the distribution ζµ/d. The joint
empirical distribution of inter-transmission times, created
by extending the fake schedule with the immediate (un-
delayed) transmissions of real events, is, based on the
transmissions’ independence, ζµ/(d+1), i.e. exponential
with the expected value µ/(d + 1). For sufficiently
large d, ζµ/(d+1) does not diverge perceptibly from the
distribution on the global timeline of fake events ζµ/d).
• Route Emulation: each source (dummy or real) forwards
the packet along a predetermined route towards the sink
(see Figure 1). The inter-transmission time between relays
is constant and significantly shorter than ∆ (and, conse-
quently, orders of magnitude smaller than µ, as opposed
to [7] where it is tied to the inter-transmission time of
dummy sources). When the real source starts transmitting
without delay, the application latency is equal to the
routing delay, which is now decoupled from the time
dynamics of the fake traffic, and can be further optimized
by minimizing the number of hops. This can be achieved
by implementing shortest-path routing, or by increasing
the transmission range of the relays through the usage of
advanced channel codes, while keeping the transmission
power constant.
• Knowing the Attacker’s Detection Methods: Eve is
assumed to be able to estimate the distribution of recorded
transmission times. The estimated distribution is used as
a reference point in the real-event detection strategy that
involves a statistical test. The basic idea of those tests
is to evaluate the distance between the distribution of
the sample data and a specified probability distribution,
which is the one that has been estimated based on a
sufficiently large data set. Alternatively, the test evaluates
if the current sample comes from the same distribution
as the previously evaluated ones. If the distance is statis-
tically significant, where the significance level is derived
from a parameter of the test, which also defines the
percentage FA of false alarms, it is decided that data
do not follow this distribution. In Section V we describe
in more detail the testing strategies that Eve may opt for.
As the latency issue is decoupled from the fake traffic design,
we seek to determine the minimal dummy population size
needed to secure a given statistical anonymity, hence mini-
mizing the overhead. For a WSN of size n, we define Wn
as per-event and per-round energy consumption of the source
anonymity mechanism. We express Wn in terms of the number
of packet-forwarding hops, where we upper-bound the length
of the publishing route by h = O
(√
n
logn
)
, assuming the
transmission range necessary for a connected network of size
n [10]. Hence, the cost of each fake source transmission will
be of the same order. With d fake sources covering each real
event, Wn = O
(
(d+ 1)
√
n
logn
)
, which demonstrates the
importance of optimizing d, as the source anonymity calls for
a sufficiently large d.
III. DECENTRALIZED GENERATION OF FAKE TRAFFIC
A. Baseline Decentralized Algorithm
In Section II we highlighted the importance of coopera-
tive and distributed shaping of the fake traffic that should
result in sufficiently dense Poisson distribution of dummy
transmissions. Let us now propose the realization of such
a decentralized system. We first establish the baseline for
the decentralized implementation. As the dummy population
covering each event needs to include on average d fake
r-real
event
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Fig. 1. Dummy population of size d accompanies an event; nodes has
been assigned the round index j at the initialization, and index assignment
sometimes includes extra effort to create spatial clusters of nodes within
dummy population, to further confuse Eve (look at the nodes delimited by a
dashed-blue ellipse).
sources, we define en epoch of duration T = µnd in which each
network node will get to be a dummy once. Then, we let each
node draw a time instant to transmit in this epoch by sampling
uniform distribution U(0, T ). The causality of transmissions
will arrange all node samples in increasing order, resulting in
exponential distribution ζµ/d of inter-transmission times. The
procedure can be extended to the consecutive epochs, so that
in the ith epoch nodes draw their transmission times from
U((i− 1)T, iT ). Note that the particular uniform distribution
range does not overlap with the ranges of distributions per-
taining to other epochs. The collective empirical distribution
of transmission times is the distribution of almost independent
disjoint events, and therefore it approximates the Poisso-
nian distribution. The independence of transmission events
is broken only on the boundary of the epochs, as with each
new epoch the nodes sample from a uniform distribution of
different disjoint range. Hence, the distribution of the interval
Z between the first event in the new epoch and the last event
in the previous epoch is not exponential.
Z = T + U − V
= T +min {X1, · · · , Xn} −max {X1, · · · , Xn} . (1)
FU (u) = P (U ≤ u) = 1− P (U > u)
= 1−
n∏
i=1
P (Xi > u)
= 1−
n∏
i=1
(1− P (Xi ≤ u))
= 1−
n∏
i=1
(1− FX(u)) = 1− (1− FX(u))
n
. (2)
The probability distribution for U is
fU (u) = n (1− FX(u))
n−1
fX(u)
=
d
µ
(
1−
u
T
)n−1
, for T ≥ u ≥ 0, (3)
and o.w. 0, which is for sufficiently large n clearly exponential
distribution of expected value µd
fU (u) ≈
1
µ
d
e
−
u
µ
d . (4)
Further,
FV (v) = P (V ≤ v) =
n∏
i=1
P (Xi ≤ v)
=
n∏
i=1
FX(v) = F
n
X(v). (5)
fV (v) = nF
n−1
X (v)fX(v) =
d
µ
( v
T
)n−1
, (6)
for T ≥ v ≥ 0. For sufficiently large n
fV (v) =
d
µ
e
−
T−v
µ
d . (7)
For W = T − V, fW (w) = dµe
−
w
µ
d , where now
Z = U +W. (8)
The random variable Z has a range [0, 2T ] , and, from (8), its
probability distribution is Erlang, with the shape parameter of
2, denoted ǫ(2,µ
d
):
fZ(z) =
∫ T
0
fU (τ)fW (z − τ)dτ
=
∫ z
0
d
µ
e
−
τ
µ
d
d
µ
e
−
z−τ
µ
d dτ = z
d2
µ2
e
−
z
µ
d . (9)
As the probability of an inter-epoch sample in the collection
of test samples of size t, where t < n, is 1t or 0, the average
test-failure probability will be at most 1tFAE+
t−1
t FA, where
FAE denotes failure probability when Erlang-distributed sam-
ples are tested on exponentiality. Even though the distribution
of Z differs from ζµ/d, we observe that the baseline decentral-
ized implementation will pass the exponentiality test for any
reasonable size of t. Such a distribution satisfies our needs for
real-event obfuscation. However, for other reasons (explained
later in this section), related to cases when the outliers of
the real-event temporal distribution coincide with the spatial
correlation of events, we propose the following realization of
the dummy traffic, dubbed group implementation.
B. Group Algorithm
In the initialization, the WSN nodes are divided into d
groups of size ⌊n/d⌋, and every node in the group is as-
signed an index i, denoting the round in which the node
will cover the source. Hence, the kth round, where k ≡
i mod ⌊n/d⌋ , i ∈ {1, ⌊n/d⌋} , will have a dummy population
of d nodes belonging to different groups. A group schedule
is created by letting the ith member select the specific time
instant to transmit a fake message, sampled from the uniform
distribution U((i−1)µ, iµ). Such an algorithm is amenable to
distributed implementation, since each node can independently
measure time and keep count of the current round. Once the
round index corresponds to node’s index modulo group size,
the node draws a sample from the pertaining distribution,
and determines its transmission time. As the independence
of transmission events is broken only on the boundary of the
rounds, the distribution of the interval Z between the first event
in the new round and the last event in the previous round is
not exponential. Once again, Z = U +W, where W = µ−V,
V = max {X1, · · · , Xd} , and U = min {X1, · · · , Xd} .
FU (u) = 1− (1− FX(u))
d
, and (10)
fU (u) =
d
µ
(
1−
u
µ
)d−1
, for µ ≥ u ≥ 0, (11)
and o.w. 0, which is, for sufficiently large d, exponential
distribution of expected value µd . Now, following a derivation
similar to (5), we obtain
fV (v) =
d
µ
(
v
µ
)d−1
, (12)
for µ ≥ v ≥ 0. For large d, the distribution of W is ζµ/d. The
random variable Z has a range [0, 2µ] , and the probability
distribution is
fZ(z) = z
d2
µ2
e
−
z
µ
d = ǫ(2,µ
d
), (13)
for sufficiently large d. Hence, with group implementation Z
follows the same Erlang distribution ǫ(2,µ
d
) as in the baseline
decentralized implementation. However, to be able to state that
the test sample of size t < n, which includes inter-round inter-
vals with probability 1/d, will be statistically indistinguishable
from the sample of exponentially distributed intervals, we
need to impose a stricter requirement for the value of d.
The average test-failure probability will be 1dFAE +
d−1
d FA.
Upper-bounding the failure probability FAE (when Erlang
samples are tested on exponentiality) with one, we obtain
that d should be at least 1FA . If the spatially-uniform events
do follow the distribution ζµ in time, this may unnecessarily
increase the per-event overhead with respect to the baseline.
1) Spatial Correlation: However, if we have a more com-
plex event distribution, by selecting the group algorithm we
are able to not only render the event’s temporal characteristics
indistinguishable, but also to obfuscate spatial correlation. For
example, a time-burst of events (temporally correlated observa-
tions), illustrated in Figure 2 (C), may coincide with the spatial
correlation of the same events. The time burst can be handled
in both decentralized algorithms by a careful design of d, as
we will illustrate in Section IV. The group implementation can
be leveraged to disguise the spatial patterns by regularly (in
each round) assigning a sufficiently large part of the dummy
population to random adjacent nodes (such as nodes within the
dashed-blue ellipse in Figure 1), while the rest of the dummy
population will be uniformly scattered across the network. If
the average spatial burst of real events is of size b < d, then in
the ith round one of d groups may be the principal one, whose
representative will therefore select the closest b unscheduled
Poisson( 3/ )m
Poisson(10/ )m
Poisson(11/ )m
d=3
Real-event timeline
Sample Window
non-Poissonian interval
U( ,2 )m m U( 2 ,3 )m m
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1 2 3th round
statistically irrelevant
(A)
(B)
m
pause
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Fig. 2. (A) Illustration of our group algorithm for fake-traffic generation,
where we randomly form d groups of nodes to cooperatively create the
schedule by sampling a series of uniform distributions. (B) Large enough d
renders small divergence from the Poisson distribution statistically irrelevant.
Bottom axis: for sufficiently large d, mixing several ”group” schedules and
the timeline of the real events (red stars) into a global transmission schedule
observed by Eve, statistically indistinguishable from Poisson schedule. (C)
Exponential distribution of events disturbed by a burst of events with small
interarrival times, called pauses.
nodes to be representatives of additional b groups, and the rest
of the dummy population is selected randomly. In the rest of
the paper we will focus on the group implementation.
IV. SIMULATIONS
When designing the simulations, we dismissed the possibil-
ity that Eve would test the schedule of any single node, since,
in our scenario, inter-transmission times per-node are large
with respect to µ (inter-event times), and, hence, it takes a lot
of time to record a reasonable test sample. Our primary goal
was to demonstrate the influence of the dummy population size
d to the statistical properties of the network-wide transmission
schedule, both in the absence of real events, and under
different stochastic models for real events. For sufficiently
large d, which is still much smaller than n, our simulations
show that the insertion of events does not statistically change
the time axis. Therefore, by running the statistical tests, Eve
does not obtain any additional information that would help her
capture the monitored object, even if the time of transmission
of a real source is not delayed. With the existing work [7],
an adjustment delay is added, and another mechanism may be
needed to fix the sample mean affected by the adjustments, to
delude Eve’s sequential analysis tests, such as SPRT [12].
Performing the Anderson-Darling (A-D) test [4], which is
a powerful test for exponentiality [3], [9], on the samples
drawn from an exponential distribution results in a percentage
of failures, which represent false alarms. The percentage of
false alarms is a random variable whose mean corresponds
to the false-alarm parameter of the test (also referred to as
the significance level), denoted by α. Due to randomness,
over certain sets of test samples this percentage will fluctuate
around the value of the parameter provided by the test. Our
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Fig. 3. The effect of the sample size on the False Alarm (FA) trend (FA as
a function of the round number, each round containing d samples): (A) For
samples drawn from an exponential distribution and the sample size di at round i FA’s
mean stays constant. (B) For uniformly sampled transmission times, the sample size
equal to d includes samples mostly from a single round, hence, exponential samples,
and FA’s mean is constant as in (A) (C) For uniform sampling and the sample size di
at round i for d = 100 FA achieves close approximation with exponential distribution
across the rounds, as opposed to d = 10 that does so only within one round (D) At
each new round we test 200 preceding samples
testing strategy monitors the rate of test failures to evaluate if
it behaves as expected for the exponential distribution. Certain
outliers do not perceptibly change the rate of failures, but
more frequent or consistent divergence from the exponential
distribution of samples will have a visible effect on the
monitored rate.
If d is not sufficiently large, inter-transmission times in
group implementation would not follow exponential distribu-
tion, and goodness-of-fit tests of exponentiality [4] will fail in
a much larger percentage of cases than the value of the test’s
FA parameter. For small d, the test results are also sensitive to
the sample size: smaller samples that span over just one round
will most likely pass the test since ordered uniform samples
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Fig. 4. For α = 0.01, false alarm (FA) vs the event number, when
events expected to be from exponential distribution ζµ, are inserted into
the fake traffic where the graph with circles represents d=10, and the graph
with diamonds d=100 (a) event distribution as expected, ζµ (b) expected
event distribution disturbed by randomly positioned samples of exponential
distribution ζµ/1000 making 20% of all samples (c) expected distribution
disturbed by randomly positioned samples of exponential distriburion ζµ/100
making 20% of all sample (d) expected distribution disturbed by randomly
positioned samples of exponential distriburion ζµ/10 making 20% of all
sample
in any range [(i − 1)µ, iµ] produce intervals described by the
exponential distribution ζµ/d. This is illustrated in Figure 3 (b).
Large number of samples would include many rounds, with
1/d portion of samples not belonging to the exponential
distribution. Figure 3 compares the pure exponential samples
whose false alarm statistics are independent of the sample size
(pane (a)), with the samples obtained using our decentralized
algorithm for d = 10 and d = 100, when the tested sample
size was d in each round (b), di in the ith round (c), or 200
constantly (d). The FA statistics are plotted as a function of the
round number i, although the sample size was changing with
the round index as di only in subfigure (c). In this case, we
see that for sufficiently large d of 100 our algorithm based
on uniform sampling achieves close approximation of the
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Fig. 5. For α = 0.01, false alarm (FA) vs the event number, where the graph
with circles represents d=10, and the graph with diamonds d=100, while (a)
expected event distribution ζµ disturbed by a burst of size 10, and pause
µ/1000 (b) expected distribution disturbed by a burst of size 10, and pause
µ/100 (c) expected distribution disturbed by a burst of size 10, and pause
µ/10
exponential distribution as it exhibits the same FA percentage
across the rounds, as opposed to d = 10 which stays expo-
nential only within one round. In subfigure (d) at each new
round we test 200 preceding samples, which for d = 10 can
be only collected after 20 rounds (notice the slope in the upper
graph for the first 20 rounds). The same sample size of 200
was used to test the influence the inserted real events had on
the percentage of test failures, illustrated in Figures 5 and 4.
As our decentralized algorithm for small dummy populations
does not approximate exponential distribution sufficiently well,
it is also more sensitive to the disturbances due to insertion
of real events. When d is small (10), interleaving the real
event schedule into the fake events timeline even improves
the results of the A-D test. Although this phenomenon can
be explained by the decreased contribution of Erlang samples
(relative to exponential), we omit the detailed explanation due
to space limitations.
As explained in the previous section, for larger d, the
exponential distribution ζµ/d is statistically indistinguishable
from the distribution of intervals produced by the group
algorithm. Accordingly, the false alarm frequency obtained
with decentralized sampling of ordered uniform distributions
is exactly what we obtained testing pure exponential samples.
The mean of the distribution is µ/d, which is also sufficiently
small to allow imperceptible interleaving of the real event
samples.
We also test the proposed location-anonymity protection
for a more general event distribution, i.e. when the empirical
distribution is disturbed with respect to the estimated one,
either by spurious outliers sampled from some ζµ/q, q > 1,
or by the bursts of events whose triggers are separated by ex-
ponentially distributed intervals according to ζµ, as illustrated
in Figure 2 (C). The latter case is of most interest to us, as
it represents a common scenario in which a whole cluster of
events, usually observed by several sensors, is related to a
single object. Temporally, the burst is a set of events whose
inter-event times, referred to as pauses, are much smaller than
one round, and whose size is a considerable fraction of the test
sample size. Such clusters may occur as a result of inherent
physical dynamics of the observed process. We assume that
the spatial correlation among events in the burst does not exist,
but we offer a solution for the opposite case as well (Figure 1).
We now provide more detail about the simulations presented in
Figures 5 and 4. We start with a pre-designed schedule where
a timeline for fake events is determined by drawing σd samples
from exponential distribution ζµ/d, where σ = 80 is the time-
window we observe, measured in rounds. We perform the
following experiments with such a fake-event schedule, where
the plots in Figures 5 and 4 illustrate the average behavior
over 250 runs, based on different, independently drawn fake
and real timelines:
• A
¯
dding real events that follow the estimated distribution
ζµ: As we insert events into the fake schedule, we perform
the A-D test on the sample which includes the event itself
and 200 previous events (if accumulated by the time of
the event occurrence).
• A
¯
dding real events that follow the estimated timeline
ζµ perturbed in 20% of the cases, picked at random,
by samples taken from an exponential probability of
smaller expected value: We perform the same A-D test
as above for each real event, where the expected value
of the disturbing distribution is µ/1000, µ/100, µ/10 (in
Fig. 5 (b), (c), (d), respectively). for d = 10, and d = 100,
• A
¯
dding real events that follow the estimated timeline ζµ,
with an exception of one burst of close samples (having
small intra-burst intervals, or pauses): We perform the
same A-D test as above for each real event, where the
values for the pause duration are µ/1000, µ/100, µ/10
(in Fig. 4 (a), (b), (c)). Over all runs of the experiment,
the burst position is kept constant (in the same round), to
highlight the impact on any single run.
All these experiments are repeated when a timeline for fake
events is generated by drawing σd samples using the base-
line decentralized algorithm, and finally when the fake event
schedule is created by the group decentralized method. It is
important to highlight that obtained false alarm statistics, in the
case of sufficiently large d, were the same for all 3 mechanisms
of fake traffic generation. Hence, our approximation performs
well for properly designed values of d. Figure 5 illustrate the
importance of the proper design, as a pause duration which
is smaller than network-level inter-transmission time µd causes
considerable increase of the FA rate if the burst is long enough.
V. DISCUSSION OF STATISTICAL TESTS
A. Tests of Exponentiality
We base our analysis on the assumption of a single statistical
test, namely Anderson-Darling test for exponentiality. Apart
from the motives of simplicity, and the existence of a reference
that employs the same test [7], we here provide additional
arguments for such an approach. The goodness-of-fit (GOF)
of a statistical model describes how well it fits a set of
observations. Measures of goodness of fit typically depict the
discrepancy between observed values and the values expected
under the hypothesized probability distribution F(x). The
classical GOF test is Pearson’s χ2 , which is good only for
discrete distributions. EDF tests refer to Empirical Distribution
Function, denoted Fn(x), and defined as the relative number
of samples (out of n) that are smaller or equal to x. EDF
tests define different statistics, based on a measure of the
discrepancy between Fn(x) and the probability distribution
in question.
In [2] five of the leading EDF statistics, including the
statistic A2 defined under A-D test, are examined in three
important situations: when the hypothesized distribution F(x)
is completely specified, when F(x) is normal, and finally, the
case that concerns us, when F(x) is exponential, with the ex-
pected value to be estimated. The paper shows that, when used
properly, EDF tests have much higher powers than previously
reported, and those of A2 are comparable, and appear to be
highly correlated with Shapiro-Wilk regression test statistics,
that were previously considered superior in power, although
difficult to compute. In fact, all the examined tests are shown
to be competitive in terms of power. In particular, A2 seem to
be especially powerful to detect divergence in the mean. The
results published in [2] are very important as EDF statistics are
easily calculated. The two facts represent the central argument
for using Anderson-Darling test as a model for Eve’s approach
to statistical inference.
However, for the A-D test of exponentiality when the
distribution parameter is unknown, we ought to calculate
an estimate of the expected value ν. Maximum likelihood
estimate of the parameter ν is exactly the mean of the samples.
While this estimate is the most likely reconstruction of the
true parameter, it is only an estimate, and, hence, the more
data points are included, the better the estimate will be.
The confidence interval of how good the estimate is can
be exactly calculated based on the number of samples [11].
Hence, when testing the most recently recorded transmission
intervals, Eve will have to consider a large enough sample
(observation window) in order to secure sufficient confidence
in the hypothesized distribution F(x). Moreover, an account
must be taken of the sample size in adjusting either the test-
statistic or its critical values for desired α. If the value of
the statistic is found to be larger than the critical value (also
called the significance point), the test claims that the sample is
not from the exponential distribution. The asymptotic critical
values have been calculated theoretically in [1]. For finite
n, significance points are difficult to find theoretically and
have been found through Monte-Carlo simulations by the same
author. The A-D significance points for various values of α,
and several sample sizes, are given in Table 2 of [2], and are
utilized in our implementation of the A-D test.
B. Utilization of Tests in Our Protection Scheme
We design fake traffic so that the test-failure statistics do
not change if exponentially distributed real events are added
to the schedule. Given the average interval between real events
µ, this is achieved if ν = µd , and d is sufficiently large. For
the reasons stated above, we assume that Eve will work with
larger sample sizes. We tested with samples of length 200,
event though for exponentially distributed real events without
outliers ten times shorter samples work equally well. When
interpreting the results of statistical tests in the context of
our protection scheme, it is of extreme importance to model
the testing strategy used by Eve. A certain percentage of test
failures, on the order of false-alarm parameter, will occur for
perfectly exponential test samples, and over time we will also
observe some variance in the rate of those failures. We refer
to this rate as the false-alarm rate. The same rate of failures
quantifies the probability of Eve’s false decision that the real
event has happened. We design the fake traffic to achieve
the statistical indistinguishability of the traffic pattern from
a Poisson process (i.e. exponential distribution of intervals),
which is achieved when the rate of failures produces by testing
the global traffic has the same dynamics as the false-alarm
rate. Only if an unexpected amount of outliers is present in
the real event distribution, the failure rate will increase above
the false-alarm level. Eve sets its FA parameter (α) based
on its own measure of how important it is not to detect an
event when there is none. If it is not important, Eve may set
the FA parameter high in order to improve the probability of
detection. In the opposite case, she will set the FA parameter
low. In both cases our protection mechanism will successfully
counteract, as the fake-traffic design did not depend on the α
parameter used in the attacker’s tests, but instead the empirical
false-alarm statistics were used as a reference to detect the
divergence from exponentiality.
In addition, by relying upon the test results, which may be
false, Eve risks to be discovered, hence creating an outage
of the global attack. Eve may opt for a different strategy:
if making a decision based on false alarm creates an outage
of the attack, Eve will not use the immediate result of the
test to make a decision. Instead, Eve will look at the trends
of failure statistics, trying to detect consistent divergence that
drives the percentage of failures above the relaxed significance
level, based on the empirical rate of failures (see Figure 5).
This detection procedure is efficient in detecting outliers, such
as a burst of events which deviates from the distribution
accounted for in the event model or/and when the set of event
transmissions are correlated in space.
VI. CONCLUSION
The proposed decentralized implementations of the fake
traffic provide desired statistical source anonymity with the
minimal overhead and a delay that depends only on the
efficiency of packet routing. Simultaneously, they utilize the
network resources in a balanced and fair way, and provide
flexibility necessary to handle different temporal and spatial
profiles of the event process. By designing only one parameter,
the size of the dummy population d, according to the known
statistical characteristic of the observed process we achieve
such flexibility. In this paper, we discussed the minimal
dummy population for several statistical models of the event.
The minimal value of d depends on the implementation, as
the deployment of group implementation requires d to be at
least 1FA . Uniform spatial distribution of events does not call
for the group implementation, and this constraint on d does
not hold. However, d needs to be large enough to render ζµ/d
and ζµ/(d+1) statistically indistinguishable. Finally, if the event
process include occasional bursts, the minimal value of d is
defined by the ratio of the expected inter-burst time µ, and
the expected intra-burst time (i.e. pause). Detailed analysis is
omitted due to space constraints.
Our future work is to formalize a metric for the goodness
of a WSN source anonymity scheme that includes the Eve’s
outage probability and her work needed to collect statistically
relevant samples. By including the adversary’s work and
vulnerabilities, we aim to better model a global eavesdropper,
and to present the quality of the source anonymity protection
as relative to the adversary’s strength. In addition, the goodness
metric should include the statistically guaranteed anonymity
level, the work spent to obfuscate the events, and the latency
guarantees by the proposed algorithm.
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